Market disciplines as a regulator of bank risk by Arthur J. Rolnick
Market D~scipline as a
Arthur J. Rolnick*
The collapse of the savings and loan industry and the failure of large
numbers of commercial banks in the 1980s have generated a reexami-
nation of bank regulation in the United States and a new banking act.
Despite this increased attention, no consensus about how to reform the
banking system has emerged. Instead, proposals range from eliminating
deposit insurance and relying solely on market discipline to expanding
deposit insurance and relying solely on bank regulators.
The banking reformers generally fall into one of two groups. The
first believes the best way to correct the problem of banks taking on too
much risk is to provide regulators with the right tools. Most in this
group question the use of market discipline because they have little
confidence that depositors can adequately monitor banks and they are
concerned that runs on individual banks could easily turn into system-
wide banking panics. The second group believes that market discipline
is the best way to regulate banks. These reformers argue that market
forces are far better than regulators at assessing and pricing bank risk
and that the benefits of market discipline outweigh the costs associated
with bank runs and banking panics.
The evidence, in my view, supports those in the pro-market group,
although it does not support unfettered competition. On the one hand,
history suggests that banking can be a very unstable industry and that
this instability has had far-reaching effects on the rest of the economy.
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On the other hand, history shows that exclusive reliance on the
regulatory approach can be costly and that market discipline can help
regulate banks. A strong case exists for coinsurance as an effective way
of introducing market discipline. Although coinsurance can be set up in
a variety of ways, the system referred to here is one in which depositors
are insured on a fixed percentage of their deposits. (For example, 80
percent of deposits in an account are insured, 20 percent uninsured.)
Depositors thus have an incentive to monitor their banks; although a
large part of their deposits is protected if their bank fails, some funds are
at risk.
This paper begins with a review of the history of instability in
banking and shows how federal deposit insurance ended this instability.
While deposit insurance solved the instability problem in deposit
banking, it created an incentive problem that recent experience suggests
has been very cosily. In the next-to-last section of the paper, an
argument is made for some market discipline by examining depositor
behavior prior to deposit insurance; arguments are then presented for
coinsurance as a credible way to introduce that market discipline.
Banking Panics Eliminated...
Governments do not often find successful solutions to economic
problems. Until recently, the deposit insurance system seemed to be one
of the few exceptions. The problem was instability in banking: too many
bank failures and cosily banking panics. The government solution was
federal deposit insurance, a program originally designed to protect small
savers and to reduce the likelihood of banking panics.
Banking" s Volatile Past
Instability in banking has a long history in the United States. Well
before 1933, when Congress decided to provide federal deposit insur-
ance, bank failures and subsequent losses to noteholders and depositors
were common features in U.S. banking.
The most infamous period was known as the Free Banking Era,
which began in 1837, shortly after the Second Bank of the United States
lost its charter and began closing its branches around the country. The
void was filled by a new type of bank charter that was permitted under
free banking laws. Michigan was the first state to pass a law that allowed
anyone to open a bank if that person met certain minimum require-
ments, one being that the notes of the bank had to be backed by state or
federal bonds as specified in the law. By 1863, a majority of states had
passed free banking laws, and hundreds of new banks were formed
across the country. Many were short-lived and failed to pay off their98 Arthur J. Rolnick
depositors in full. While experience varied among the states, with those
in the West having the most bank failures, problems occurred in most of
the free banking states.
Among the states studied by Rolnick and Weber (1983, 1988),
Minnesota’s experience appears to be one of the worst. Shortly after
becoming a state in 1858, Minnesota passed a free banking law. Within
a few months, the state had 16 new banks. By the summer of 1859,
however, 11 of those banks had closed and nine had failed to pay off
noteholders in full. In five cases, noteholders received less than 25 cents
on the dollar.
Looking at the four states in the Rolnick-Weber sample, we can see
that banking problems were not confined to Minnesota. The number of
free banks chartered between 1838 and 1863 in New York, Wisconsin,
Indiana, and Minnesota totaled 709. Of these, 339 closed within a few
years after they had opened (some within a few months), and 104 of the
339 failed to pay their noteholders in full.
Neither the passage of the National Banking Act in 1863 nor the
establishment of the Federal Reserve System in 1913 ended these
problems. In fact, in some ways the problems grew worse. Banking
panics associated with contractions in economic activity became a
regular and disturbing feature of the U.S. economy.
The National Banking Act was an attempt by Congress to create a
uniform national currency and a more stable banking environment than
the state-run banking system. The areas regulated by the act included
branching, capital and reserves, types of loans, and amounts lent to any
single borrower. The act also provided for annual bank examinations
that were generally regarded as more stringent than state bank exami-
nations.
The act eventually succeeded in creating a uniform currency, but it
failed to achieve the banking stability it was designed to create. While
the number of bank failures was relatively modest over these years, in
eight different years as many as 100 banks failed. And while systemwide
banking problems had existed before 1863, they became more frequent
during the national banking period (from 1863 to 1913).
According to Sprague (1910), major banking panics occurred
throughout the national banking period. He identifies five panics, in the
years 1873, 1884, 1890, 1893, and 1907. He claims that each originated
with the failure of one or more large financial institutions in New York
City, each occurred in the autumn, and each was associated with a large
decline in real economic activity (Chari 1989). In three of these panics
(1873, 1893, and 1907) suspension of convertibility of bank deposits into
cash was widespread. Sprague describes the 1907 panic as the longest
and most severe. Other historians have noted that it was the catalyst
that led to the creation of the Federal Reserve System.
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period find less evidence of systemwide problems than is reported by
Sprague, but all find evidence of some general loss of confidence in the
banking system. Sprague is somewhat vague about the definition of a
banking panic: He suggests that you know it when you see it. Benston,
Eisenbeis, Horvitz, Kane, and Kaufman (1986) give a more precise
definition: A banking panic is a period of widespread bank runs and
failures that is accompanied by a decline in total bank deposits and a net
currency outflow from the banking system. Using this definition, they
identify only three such occurrences during the national banking period
(1878, 1893, and 1908) corresponding to only two of the periods Sprague
identifies. Dwyer and Gilbert (1989), defining a panic as a period when
banks suspend payments, also identify only three episodes (1873, 1893,
and 1907), corresponding to three of the periods Sprague identifies.
Differences also arise between the work of Sprague and these more
recent studies on the impact of banking panics on economic activity.
Benston and his colleagues (1986, p. 59) argue that it was somewhat
weaker than Sprague suggests. They find that the rate of bank failures
between 1875 and 1920 was only modestly correlated with the rate of
business failures, with an index of industrial production, and with an
index of common stock prices. Dwyer and Gilbert (1989, pp. 53-54) find
that the panics during the national banking period resulted, on average,
in relatively small losses to depositors at failed banks and that the losses
declined over time.
The debate on the effects of banking panics, however, is far from
over. A very recent macroeconometric study of the impact of bank
failures on economic activity during the national banking period (Gross-
man 1993) shows that bank failures had a substantial negative impact on
aggregate economic activity. In addition, many think the banking
problems of the 1920s and 1930s contributed to the Great Depression
(Friedman and Schwartz 1963, Ch. 7; Bernanke 1983). The Federal
Reserve System did not end banking instability; if anything, the prob-
lems got worse and the impact on economic activity appeared to be even
greater. After the Fed was established in 1913, the United States
experienced a large number of bank failures. In the 1920s, the United
States lost roughly 6,000 of its 30,000 banks. Between 1930 and 1933, in
the worst financial panic in U.S. history, it lost another 9,000 banks as
real economic activity fell by one-third.
Deposit Insurance’s Stabilizing Effect
The banking crisis of the early 1930s led Congress to establish a
federal deposit insurance system. Deposit insurance was not a new idea.
To the contrary, Congress had debated deposit insurance for roughly 50
years. But it took three separate banking panics between 1930 and 1933IO0 Arthur ]. Rolnick
to convince Congress that more than the Federal Reserve System was
required to end the instability in banking.
Consequently, to build depositor confidence and help prevent
panics, Congress established the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(FDIC). On January 1, 1934, the FDIC began insuring deposits up to
$2,500 in banks that had chosen to become members of this new
government corporation. Over the years, the fraction of total deposits
that was insured gradually increased as more depositors chose insured
commercial banks and as the maximum deposit coverage was increased.
Today, the FDIC insures deposits up to $100,000 per account, and this
insurance covers over 75 percent of all commercial bank deposits.
Federal deposit insurance brought stability to banking and an end
to banking panics. It is difficult to say how many bank failures are
acceptable, but the average annual number was relatively small until the
1980s. In the first five years of the deposit insurance system (1934 to
1939) commercial bank failures averaged just over 50 a year. Over the
next five years, the average declined to 17, and after that, it did not get
above 11 until 1982.1 The history of the savings and loan (S&L) industry
has been similar. It was not until after 1982 that more than just a handful
of S&L failures occurred each year.2
Even when failures of both commercial banks and S&Ls increased
sharply after 1982, the United States experienced only a few bank runs
and no systemwide banking panic (Bentson and others 1986, Ch. 2).
However, a price was paid for this success. The deposit insurance
system, originally intended to protect only the small saver, was ex-
tended to protect virtually all bank depositors.
While some debate continues as to exactly when the full insurance
coverage policy .was adopted, all agree that it was well in place after
regulators rescued the Continental Illinois Bank in the spring of 1984.
Considered one of the premier banks in the country at the beginning of
the 1980s, Continental took large losses on its energy loans. In the
spring of 1984, a modern-day run on the bank took place when many of
the uninsured depositors tried to electronically remove their funds from
Continental. Fearing that the run on Continental could spill over to
other troubled banks, the bank regulators stepped in and announced
that all deposits would be protected by the FDIC. The run was halted,
and a possible banking panic was averted. The bailout of Continental
soon became known as an application of "too-big-to-fail": the policy that
1 Source: Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.
2 Problems with both commercial banks and S&Ls developed in the high-inflation,
high-interest-rate environment of the 1970s and early 1980s, but they did not result in a
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asserts that some large U.S. banks must be given preferential treatment
to prevent them from going bankrupt.
The price of stopping the run on Continental turned out to be larger
than one of extending protection to uninsured depositors at large banks.
Smaller banks began to complain that they could not compete in the
market for large deposits if depositors knew that uninsured accounts at
large banks would be protected by the FDIC. So shortly after announc-
ing the too-big-to-fail policy, regulators proclaimed that deposits .at all
banks would be protected. And so they were. Between 1985 and 1990,
99 percent of uninsured deposits at all failed banks were fully protected
by the FDIC. In order to eliminate banking panics and to provide "a
level playing field," regulators substantively changed the deposit insur-
ance system from one that was intended only to protect small depositors
to one that protects all depositors.
¯ . . But Moral Hazard Introduced
That insurance on 100 percent of deposits would work, in the sense
of eliminating bank runs and banking panics, is rather obvious. A less
obvious point is that while it corrects one problem inherent in deposit
banking, it introduces another inherent in deposit insurance itself.
Economic theory suggests a disconcerting side effect of deposit insur-
ance: Profit-maximizing banks will take on the riskiest portfolio possible
(Kareken and Wallace 1978; Kareken 1983). And recent experiences with
both S&Ls and commercial banks have provided much support for this
theory.
Most insurance has a costly side effect known in the insurance
literature as moral hazard. Consider the following description of this
problem (Boyd and Rolnick 1989, p. 4):
People who are insured against a particular risk have an incentive to change
their behavior. Consider the owners of a factory who purchase fire insurance.
Prior to this purchase, they would have to bear the entire cost of a con-
flagration. Once insured, though, a great part of the cost will be borne by the
insurance company. For a fixed annual fee the owners’ concern about such a
loss is significantly alleviated, which is the obvious benefit of insurance.
Consequently, the insurance company should expect the insured to take
¯ more risks than they would have without the insurance. The insured can now
afford to be a little less cautious about the disposing of flammable materials
such as old paint cans or chemical containers. If the insurance company
hopes to remain in business, it must take account of such behavioral changes
when pricing and administering policies.
Federal deposit insurance suffers from the same problem of creating
the wrong incentives. In fact, theory suggests it may suffer from an102 Arthur J. Rolnick
extreme form of moral hazard. Depositors, once insured, have no reason
to worry about the riskiness of their bank’s portfolio. And riskier banks,
therefore, do not have to pay higher rates to their depositors. Assuming
that riskier portfolios yield higher returns than safer portfolios and that
bank owners are risk neutral, or can readily diversify risk, we can show
that banks will take on the riskiest portfolio possible.
To illustrate how deposit insurance distorts a bank’s behavior
toward risk, consider the hypothetical example of a Mr. Smith who,
with $200,000 in cash, opens a new bank. We will assume Mr. Smith
meets all the requirements to get a national bank charter from the Office
of the Comptroller of the Currency, becomes a member of the FDIC, and
opens the Smith National Bank with $100,000 in cash. At this point, Mr.











Assume Mr. Smith offers a deposit rate somewhat above that of his
competitors---say, 10 percent--and as a result attracts $900,000 in deposits.







while Mr. Smith’s balance sheet remains unchanged.
Of course, leaving the bank’s funds idle is no way to run a bank. To
put this money to work, Mr. Smith heads to Las Vegas, finds the nearest
casino with a roulette wheel, and bets the bank’s $1,000,000 on black. To
hedge his investment, Mr. Smith bets $100,000 of his own money on
red. The balance sheets now becomeMARKET DISCIPLINE AS A REGULATOR OF BANK RISK
Smith National Bank





Mr. Smith’s Balance Sheet
A bet on red $100,000
Bank Stock $100,000
Net Worth     $200,000
From the bank’s point of view the investment is risky, but for Mr.
Smith the overall strategy has a very high expected return and is
perfectly safe. (This example assumes only two possible outcomes: red
or black.) Consider the financial result if the roulette wheel turns up the
color red. Mr. Smith’s bank goes bankrupt, the bank’s assets are lost,
and the bank stock is worthless. Depositors, however, are protected by
the FDIC. Even the interest on the deposits is insured by the FDIC. And
Mr. Smith has not lost any money because he had a perfect hedge. Since
his own money was bet on red, his net worth is still $200,000.
Now consider the equally likely outcome that the roulette wheel
turns up the color black. On the one hand, Mr. Smith loses his bet and
$100,000 of his own money. On the other hand, the new balance sheets
show Mr. Smith’s net worth is up by a factor of more than five.
Smith National Bank






A bet on red
Bank Stock




The point here is that 100 percent deposit insurance creates an
incentive for bank owners to take on much more risk than they would
otherwise. Under the assumption that owners can perfectly hedge bank
risk (or, equivalently, that owners are risk neutral because their bank104 Arthur J. Rolnick
stock is only a small percentage of their wealth), banks will take on the
riskiest portfolio possible. The effect is essentially heads the banker
wins, tails the taxpayers lose; depositors are indifferent because they
receive the same return regardless of the outcome.
Some might argue that this is an extreme example, because bankers
probably would not be allowed to bet their funds in Las Vegas. But I
submit that some of the loans and direct investments that banks are
permitted to make are at least as risky as Mr. Smith’s portfolio strategy.
Others might argue that while the owners of banks may have an
incentive to bet the bank, the managers of banks do not. Managers value
job security, they are risk averse, and they cannot hedge their risk so
readily. Hence bank management will be an important force counter-
vailing the incentive effects of moral hazard. This is not certain. If bank
owners want bank management to take risky portfolios, they can easily
provide their managers with the proper incentives to take on that risk--
high salaries, performance bonuses, and generous severance packages.
Regardless of how extreme these assumptions are, most would
agree that a theory should be ultimately judged on how well it confronts
the data. Based on this criterion, the theory underlying the effects of
moral hazard does quite well.
The most overwhelming evidence supporting this theory has been
provided by the behavior of the S&L industry. With the passage of the
Monetary Control Act of 1980 and the Garn-St Germain Act of 1982,
virtually all deposits at S&Ls became insured and S&Ls were given carte
blanche to invest in high-return, high-risk portfolios. And they did so
with a vengeance. (In fact, some regulators at the time actually encour-
aged S&Ls to take risks, as if they needed such encouragement.) In less
than six years, the S&L industry was in serious trouble. By 1988, close to
one-half of all S&Ls were thought to be bankrupt or near-bankrupt;
losses that eventually will be borne by taxpayers are now estimated at
$200 billion in today’s dollars.
The evidence supporting the effects of moral hazard is not confined
to the S&L industry. Commercial banks also had their share of prob-
lems, once the policy of 100 percent deposit protection was in place. As
noted earlier, prior to the 1980s, relatively few banks failed. During the
1980s, that record changed dramatically. In 1982 and 1983, 42 and 48
banks closed, respectively. Between 1984 and 1988, the average annual
number of bank failures exceeded 144. By 1988, several of the largest
banks in the United States were believed to be in at least some financial
trouble. And by 1990, the FDIC was estimated to have a negative net
worth of roughly $70 billion.3
A comparison to the Great Depression is useful to create some
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perspective on the size of this financiaI debacle. Consider that for the
six-year period starting in 1930 and ending in 1935, the following losses
occurred:
Losses to depositors of closed banks
Losses to owners of dosed banks






Source: Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (1940, p. 66).
After adjusting for inflation, the $6.7 billion total is less than 25 percent
of the estimated cost of the S&L bailout. Based on per capita real loss,
the $6.7 billion is still only one-half the loss of the S&L bailout.
A Solution
The history of banking under 100 percent deposit insurance yields
two lessons. As argued above, one lesson is that moral hazard is more
than just a theory. The other lesson is that despite a host of regulatory
agencies and well-intentioned bank regulators, the regulatory system
failed to contain the moral hazard induced by 100 percent deposit
insurance. The $200 billion S&L taxpayer bailout and an insolvent FDIC
are overwhelming evidence of that regulatory failure.
While ways may be found to improve the regulatory system, they
are all likely to fail without the aid of market discipline. A problem with
leaving the containment of moral hazard solely up to the regulatory system
is that measuring risk is difficult. Moreover, even if regulators could
somehow measure risk, they have no way of knowing how much risk is
optimal. Consequently, either regulators will force banks to take too little
risk (and the public will complain about a credit crunch) or they will allow
banks to take too much risk (and taxpayers will face another large bailout).
Regulation Will Fail
To make these arguments about the regulatory reform approach to
moral hazard more concrete, consider two specific reforms that are part
of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991
(FDICIA). The first is to base capital requirements on risk. Under
FDICIA, banks that hold riskier portfolios are required to hold more
capital. This seems like a good idea, because a private insurance
company would probably operate this way. But a private insurance
company also has to make a profit and thus would assess risk accord-
ingly. Without a genuine profit test, how are regulators to make these
calculations? Even if they could assess the risk, how are they to set the106 Arthur J. Rolnick
capital requirements to achieve the right amount of risk? They have no
way of knowing the right amount of risk without a profit test. So the
answer to these questions is, they cannot.
The early closure reform also raises some disturbing issues. Early
closure means that banks will be closed before their net worth becomes
negative. Again, this is a reform that appears sound. If banks could be
closed early, they would have little incentive to take on a risky portfolio.
Consider what early closure would mean for Mr. Smith’s bank. Regu-
lators would have to close the bank before the roulette wheel was spun;
owners would not share in the winnings. (It is interesting to note that at
this point, the bank would have a capital-to-asset ratio of 10 percent and
a very high expected net worth.) The success of the early closure policy,
however, is based on a questionable assumption: Regulators can mon-
itor banks closely enough to close banks in time. This assumes not only
that regulators have detailed and timely information, but also that the
value of banking loans and investments changes in a smooth and contin-
uous way. Generally speaking, the latter is not true because the value of
bank loans can change very sharply over short periods of time. Moreover,
unlike the roulette wheel bet, the market value of a bank loan is often
difficult to assess. As a result, unless the regulators are virtually running
the bank, a provision for early closure will not contain moral hazard.
Market Discipline Has Succeeded
Thus, relying solely on regulators either will fail to control moral
hazard and banks will take on too much risk--or will result in
excessive regulation--and banks will take on too little risk. Some might
argue that this is the best to be hoped for and that regulators must be
relied on to manage this problem. This argument favors the regulatory
approach because it assumes that the market (that is, depositors) cannot
be relied on to discipline banks’ behavior toward risk. Under this view,
depositors are believed to be uninformed and hence unable to discipline
banks. History, however, reveals a much different view of the unin-
sured depositor, one that shows that market discipline can be an
effective regulator of bank risk.
Evidence from the free banking period (from 1837 to 1863) dispels
the view that the public was ignorant of how banks invested funds. The
liabilities of free banks were bank notes that, like checks today, served
as a medium of exchange within the local area. Holders of free bank
notes, like uninsured depositors, faced the risk that the value of a free
bank’s assets might not be sufficient to redeem its notes in lawful
money. How informed any particular noteholder was, of course, is
difficult to know. What is known is that information on individual banks
and the riskiness of the investments and loans was readily available. In
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public was regularly informed by local newspapers about the quality of
the bonds that Minnesota free banks used to back their notes.4 Local
newspapers also ran articles on each bank, including facts about the
character of the bank officers and the nature of their nonbank businesses
within the state. In most of the major cities in the United States,
newspapers known as bank note reporters became very popular. These
papers gave the most recent discounts for bank notes traded in the
major money centers around the country. They also listed banks whose
notes had been counterfeited, banks whose notes were no longer
trading at par, and banks that had closed. Well before Congress decided
the federal government should protect holders of bank liabilities, the
private market found ways to inform the public and help them to assess
the riskiness of bank liabilities.
Another example of private markets revealing information about
the riskiness of banks can be found in the 1920s. A study of interest rates
paid by state-chartered banks in New York City (Rolnick 1987) shows
that banks with the riskier portfolios, other things equal, paid the higher
deposit rates. The public did not have to be very sophisticated to distin-
guish between high-risk and low-risk banks; if depositors wanted relative
safety, they just had to find the banks that offered the lower deposit rates.
And, on average, they would have been correct: A greater percentage of
the high-risk banks failed during the Great Depression. This is no different
from the way the bond markets work today. The public can readily
distinguish between a junk bond and a safe bond by its price; that is,
higher-risk bonds sell at a lower price and at an expected higher rate of
return than lower-risk bonds. And studies of financial markets consistently
find a close positive correlation between risk and return.
The public’s ability to discipline bank behavior toward risk goes
beyond requiring risk-adjusted deposit rates. Given the nature of many
deposit accounts, the public can withdraw funds from a bank on very
short notice. While bank runs generally have a bad reputation in the
banking literature, they surely act as powerful incentives to prevent
banks from taking on too much risk.s Just knowing depositors have the
ability to withdraw their funds on short notice creates an incentive for
banks to invest in relatively safe and liquid assets. The question of how
much risk a bank should incur (a question I would argue regulators
cannot answer) is answered by the interaction between the bank’s desire
to make a profit and its depositors’ willingness to trade safety for return.
Finally, evidence under the limited deposit insurance system in
effect prior to the 1980s suggests that with at least some uninsured
4 Banks that backed their notes with railroad bonds were known in the press as the
railroad banks. Pictures of railroads actually appeared on some of the notes of these banks.
5 See Kaufman (1988) and Calomiris and Kahn (1991) for the exceptions.108 Arthur J. Rolnick
depositors, banks were much safer than they were after Congress and
regulators adopted 100 percent insurance. One has to be somewhat
cautious about making this argument, though, because other factors
may have caused this outcome. For example, the public may always
have thought that big banks were too big to fail. Or regulations that had
the effect of limiting bank competition and creating monopoly rents
could also have served to constrain moral hazard (Keeley 1990).
The issue, then, is not whether the market can discipline bank
behavior, for surely it can. The issue is how willing policymakers are to
trade off one problem, moral hazard, for another, banking panics. Once
the system moves credibly away from 100 percent deposit insurance
coverage, it introduces the possibility of bank runs and therefore some
probability of a banking panic. I have argued that the cost of moral
hazard substantially exceeds the estimated direct costs of the banking
problems in the 1930s. This is at least one argument in favor of
introducing some market discipline. Another argument is that the
Federal Reserve System is much better prepared today to contain
banking panics than it was in the 1930s.
Ultimately, therefore, the issue turns into two questions: How
should market discipline be introduced? How much of that discipline is
optimal?
Coinsurance Is a Good Choice
The deposit insurance system can be reformed in several ways to
reintroduce market discipline. A serious obstacle to effective reform, a
dilemma known as time inconsistency, led Boyd and Rolnick (1989) to
recommend coinsurance.6
I favor coinsurance over enforcement of the explicit insurance limits
in place today because it is a more credible policy. The limited success of
the commitment to have large depositors take large losses is symptom-
atic of the time inconsistency dilemma: A policy that is best for the long
run may not be best for the short run and vice versa (Boyd and Rolnick
1989, p. 12):
Consider the dilemma as it arises with deposit insurance. Once a bank is on
the verge of failing, it often appears that the best policy is to protect all
depositors, both insured and uninsured. The FDIC can protect all depositors
by arranging the purchase and assumption of a troubled bank by a healthy
one. For decades this approach was often used because it minimized the
FDIC’s cost of handling a failing bank. This was the low-cost method, at least
partly because in a purchase and assumption transaction the charter value is
6 See also Kydland and Prescott (1977).MARKET DISCIPLINE AS A REGULATOR OF BANK RISK 109
captured by the FDIC. This approach (or publicly announcing that all
depositors will be protected) has the additional advantage that actual or
potential bank runs are halted, allowing the reorganization to proceed in an
orderly manner.
While such policies may indeed minimize the cost of any particular bank
closure, they do not necessarily represent the best long-run policy. That’s
because the uninsured depositors will learn over time that, whatever is the
announced policy, their deposits are actually safe. When that happens,
"uninsured depositors" no longer care about bank risk and market discipline
is lost. Consequently, there are more bank failures than there would have
been, had uninsured depositors not been protected.
Any attempt to reintroduce market discipline, therefore, must be
time consistent. That is, a credible commitment must be made that
uninsured depositors will not be protected by the FDIC or any other
government agency, even uninsured depositors at large banks.
Coinsurance is a system in which depositors’ coverage is some fixed
percentage of their deposits. For example, depositors could be insured
for up to 80 percent of their deposits. Then, if their bank should fail,
depositors could lose up to 20 percent of their funds. Depositors would
have a stake in how their bank invests its assets. To be competitive with
banks that hold safe portfolios, banks that hold risky ones would have to
offer their depositors a higher rate of return. Assuming depositors are risk
averse, hold a nontrivial portion of their wealth in bank deposits, and
cannot hedge this risk, coinsurance would help contain moral hazard. No
longer would banks--representing the preferences of both owners and
depositors--have an incentive to invest in the most risky portfolio.
With coinsurance, as opposed to the current $100,000 insured
maximum, such a commitment can be made credible because the losses
to any one depositor, including other banks, would be limited to some
fraction of their deposits. Losses at failing large banks, for example,
Would be spread across all depositors, and any depositor’s loss would be
bounded by the coinsurance percentage. The probability of large bank
failures causing widespread bank runs throughout the banking system
would, therefore, be less than if all uninsured deposits beyond some
fixed limit were at risk; thus, little rationale would remain for protecting
uninsured depositors.
One last issue needs to be addressed. How much coinsurance is
optimal? I do not pretend to know the answer to this question, but an
advantage to using coinsurance to introduce market discipline is that it
can be phased in. Regulators can observe the risk premium that
develops in the market for bank deposits as the coinsured limit is
decreased and pick the risk premium they judge to be appropriate
against other market measures of risk.110 Arthur J. Rolnick
Conclusion
The lessons from the financial debacle of the 1980s seem clear. The
moral hazard problem created by 100 percent deposit insurance is not
just a theory; it has had costly, real world consequences. Our policy of
relying solely on regulators to manage this problem has been a mistake.
The arguments for introducing some market discipline are compel-
ling. While this could be done in different ways, coinsurance is the way
most likely to succeed.
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